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Abstract 
Considerable effort and ingenuity is expended on developing theodicies in response to the 
problem caused by evolution in terms of pain and suffering in creation and the fact that God 
is good and His creation is good. From a physiological and neurological perspective, it is 
clear that many creatures experience pain. However, pain is an essential part of the 
evolutionary process being clearly adaptive, potentially preventing a worse outcome for a 
creature, namely death. A more difficult question is that of suffering. It will be shown that the 
question of animal suffering is identical to the issue of sentience and the “hard problem” of 
consciousness. After reviewing the evidence for animal consciousness and then suffering, we 
conclude with a brief reflection on why Christians should treat animals well. 
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Introduction 
It is notable that Darwin seemed to have no doubts that animals1 could suffer: 
“…the lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery.” 
and “The fact that the lower animals are excited by the same emotions as ourselves is so 
well established that it will not be necessary to weary the reader by many details.” 2 
                                                 
1 Here and subsequently animal refers to non-human animal. 
2 1871, The descent of man and selection in relation to sex – quoted in M.S. Dawkins, “Through animal eyes: 
what behaviour tells us,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 100 (2006): 4-10. Her book M.S. Dawkins, Why 
animals matter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) is also relevant to the topic of this paper. 
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A natural question to ask is: was Darwin right to be so sure? For Christians, if we accept 
evolution as the means by which species have come into existence, animal suffering appears 
to pose a challenge to the goodness of God and his creation.  
 
In formulating a Christian response it is often taken for granted that animals suffer. As a 
result considerable effort has been expended on theodicies3 that try to justify why this has to 
be the case if God is a good God and has the power to prevent it happening. For human 
beings the so-called “free will defense” can be used with regard to moral evil. This, in nuce, 
states that a consequence of humans having free will (a good thing) is the possibility that they 
will do evil, and so cause suffering. It is unclear how this applies to animals as it is uncertain 
whether they have free will in the same sense as humans. Recently, Creegan, Murray and 
Southgate (among others) have tried to provide theodicies for animal suffering.4 However, 
none of these authors discuss the scientific evidence for animal suffering in any detail they 
just assume it exists.5 Here we seek to address the question of whether animals suffer like us, 
focussing on the scientific evidence. 
 
                                                 
3 The term theodicy was coined by Leibniz in 1710 and means  “seeking to justify the ways of God to man.” 
4 N.H. Creegan, Animal suffering and the problem of evil (Oxford: OUP, 2013); M. Murray, Nature red in tooth 
and claw: theism and the problem of animal suffering (Oxford: OUP, 2008); C. Southgate, The groaning of 
creation: God, evolution and the problem of evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008). See also 
E.A. Johnson, Ask the beasts: Darwin and the God of love (London: Bloomsbury Publishing plc, 2014) and D.L. 
Clough, On Animals: volume 1 Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2012). The most recent animal 
theodicy is T. Dougherty, The problem of animal pain: a theodicy for all creatures (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014). 
5 Note too that there is an extensive philosophical and ethical literature concerned with issues such as animal 
liberation and rights, for example: P. Singer Animal liberation (2nd edn; London, Thorsons, 1990); T. Regan The 
case for animal rights (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1983); D. DeGrazia Taking animals seriously: 
mental life and moral status (Cambridge, CUP, 1996). A useful summary is provided by D. DeGrazia Animal 
rights: a very short introduction (Oxford: OUP, 2002). However, these books too do not examine in any detail 
the scientific evidence for animal suffering. The focus here is on the science and we choose not to pursue the 
philosophical aspects of the problem, which requires a different and separate paper. 
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On pain and consciousness 
Physiologically, somatogenic pain is commonly considered a consequence of the stimulation 
of sensory neurons called nociceptors in response to potentially damaging stimuli.6 From an 
evolutionary perspective, pain is adaptive. It serves a number of important functions 
including the avoidance of dangerous situations or simply keeping damaged limbs still while 
they heal.7 The ability to feel pain has evolved because, being unpleasant, it keeps creatures 
away from the larger evolutionary disaster of death.8 There seems to be no doubt that animals 
can feel pain in the sense of a neurophysiological response to stimuli. The range of creatures 
that are thought to be able to experience pain is expanding. For example, fish are now 
thought to possess the necessary neurophysiological mechanisms to feel pain, whereas 
previously this was thought not to be the case.9 Likewise, there is evidence that crabs 
                                                 
6 K.M.D. Rutherford, “Assessing pain in animals,” Animal Welfare 11 (2002): 31-53. Rutherford discusses 
issues such as the relationship between nociception and pain, which will not be pursued here. 
7 P. Wall, Pain: the science of suffering (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999). For a Christian perspective 
see the now classic P. Brand & P. Yancey, The gift of pain (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1997) 
(previously entitled: The gift nobody wants). Brand was a leprosy doctor and leprosy destroys the ability to feel 
pain. His view of pain is summed up “Previously, I had thought of pain as a blemish in creation, God’s one great 
mistake. …pain stands out as an extraordinary feat of engineering valuable beyond measure.” (p.62). He also 
distinguishes between pain and suffering “In more advanced cases of leprosy, my patients felt no pain at 
all…yet all of them suffered” (p. 251). 
8 M. S. Dawkins, “Evolution and animal welfare,” Quarterly Reviews of Biology 73 (1998): 305-328. 
9 L. Sneddon, “The evidence for pain in fish: the use of morphine as an analgesic,” Applied Animal Behaviour 
Science 83 (2003): 153-162; S.Y. Cotte, “Are fish the victims of ‘speciesism’? A discussion about fear, pain and 
animal consciousness,” Fish Physiology and Biochemistry 38 (2012): 5-15. Anecdotally, one of us once knew a 
scientist involved in experiments with fish who noted that he had not been troubled by animal rights protestors 
because fish lacked the “cuddle factor.” This shows that we as human beings identify with some creatures more 
than others and this can affect our assessment of the scientific evidence. Or, in post-modern terms, there is no 
neutral viewpoint / stance. 
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experience pain too.10 Therefore, the scientific evidence that many creatures can experience 
pain seems indisputable.11  
 
Suffering, however, is a broader issue than just the question of whether a creature can 
experience pain per se.12 For example, withdrawing a hand (or paw) after touching a hotplate 
on a cooker would involve feeling pain but would not generally be classed as an experience 
of suffering. Both animal and human would feel pain due to tissue damaging heat, but this 
feeling would not necessarily be considered suffering in the usual sense of the term. This 
raises a potentially important distinction as determining whether an animal responds to 
painful stimuli, that is, feels them (it must feel them otherwise it wouldn’t respond) is 
possible empirically and, as noted above, has been done for a variety of creatures. In contrast, 
determining empirically whether an animal is self-aware enough to be considered to be 
experiencing “suffering” is more problematic. 
 
In trying to determine what animal suffering (as opposed to pain) might be, it is helpful to 
distinguish between two types of consciousness:13 
1 – sentience / phenomenal consciousness / irreflexive consciousness / primary 
consciousness 
                                                 
10 R.W. Elwood & M. Appel, “Pain experience in hermit crabs?” Animal Behaviour 77 (2009): 1243-1247. 
11 An interesting point about pleasure and pain is made by P. Bloom, How pleasure works: why we like what we 
like (London: Vintage Books, 2011). On page 52 he notes that pleasure from pain is uniquely human (e.g. eating 
hot chili or hot curry), and tongue-in-cheek says that the defining feature of humans is that we are the only 
animal that like Tabasco sauce. 
12 One referee critiqued our distinction between pain and suffering and we agree that this distinction can be 
difficult to make (not least because the terms are used in different ways in different contexts in the literature). 
Nevertheless, we choose to retain the distinction as we think it is helpful in understanding the different 
contributions that biology and philosophy/psychology can make to this issue.  
13 B. Bermond, “A neurophysiological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness and suffering,” 
Animal Welfare 10 (2001): S47-S62; Dawkins, “Through animal eyes” 
 5 Srokosz & Kolstoe 
2 – self-consciousness / reflexive consciousness / meta-cognition / higher order thoughts14 
Type 1 consciousness refers to the basic experiences of seeing, hearing, pain, hunger, thirst, 
and so on. Type 2 consciousness refers to what might be termed self-awareness or the ability 
to have thoughts about thoughts. As noted above, there is strong empirical evidence that a 
variety of animals have type 1 consciousness, but it is less clear as to whether they have type 
2 consciousness (and indeed how one might be able to empirically determine this). This is 
relevant as it may be that whilst pain is an aspect of type 1 consciousness, suffering may be 
an aspect of type 2 consciousness.  
 
The whole issue of type 2 consciousness has been referred to as the “hard problem”15 of 
consciousness because, as noted by Dawkins,16 “we have absolutely no idea how nerve cells 
give rise to subjective experiences… we do not know how sentience arises from brain cells or 
how, if at all, brains with sentience work differently from brains without it, we have no real 
idea what to look for in other species in our search for animal sentience.” Elsewhere the same 
author notes that consciousness is almost impossible to define.17 Nevertheless, some 
researchers make further distinctions between types of consciousness, in order to try to make 
empirical progress. Tononi & Koch18 suggest that consciousness is graded and that it changes 
over the lifetime of an organism. For example, consider the difference in consciousness 
exhibited by a human baby, young child and adult.19 If this difference is found in humans 
                                                 
14 higher order thoughts – sometimes abbreviated as HOT 
15 A term first coined by D.J. Chalmers, “Facing up to the problem of consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 2 (1995): 200-219. 
16 Dawkins, “Through animal eyes” 
17 Dawkins, Why animals matter, 44. 
18 G. Tononi & C. Koch, “Consciousness: here, there and everywhere,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B 370 (2015): doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167. 
19 How self-conscious is a new-born baby? Of course this impinges of who we consider to be a person and 
therefore how we might treat infants. The extreme end of this spectrum is seen in the proposal that infanticide 
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then there may be varying grades of consciousness exhibited by different species in the 
animal kingdom. Fabbro et al.20 propose four levels of self: primary self, core self, self-
consciousness and narrative self. The latter, the ability to unify the self into a coherent story, 
they ascribe only to humans (and probably requires language). However, the approach we are 
interested in here is how the existence of different types of conscious experience might be 
determined empirically for animals. For human beings the standard way to assess types of 
conscious experience is through so-called “accurate report.”21 This depends on the use of 
language so is of little use when studying non-human animals. Seth et al.22 propose multiple 
criteria for consciousness but note that not all are easily testable and that some are not 
currently testable. So, in the absence of language based self-reporting, what aspects of 
consciousness, in particular type 2 consciousness (an otherwise subjective phenomenon), can 
be studied objectively? 
 
The lines of empirical evidence pursued for animal consciousness are: neurophysiological 
(the search for neural and hormonal correlates of consciousness); behavioural (the search for 
                                                                                                                                                        
might be acceptable e.g. A. Giubilini & F. Minerva, “After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?” Journal 
of Medical Ethics 39 (2013): 261-263.  
20 F. Fabbro, S.M. Aglioti, M. Bergamasco, A. Clarici & J. Panksepp, “Evolutionary aspects of self- and world 
consciousness in vertebrates,” Frontiers of Human Neuroscience 9 (2015): doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00157. 
Somewhat confusingly they also use the terms anoetic, noetic and autonoetic to refer to primary consciousness, 
higher-order consciousness and self-related notions of past and future. They make the interesting point that only 
humans seem to be able to conceive of their own death, though it is unclear on what basis they make the 
statement. This impinges on how we might view suffering in humans and animals, as some (perhaps much) of 
human suffering is undoubtedly connected with the knowledge of impending death. Of course this is where the 
Christian gospel has tremendous power as Jesus’ death and resurrection free believers from the fear of death 
(Heb. 2:15). 
21 A.K. Seth, B.J. Baars & D.B. Edelman, “Criteria for consciousness in humans and other animals,” 
Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005): 119-139. Even with human beings the concept of accurate report 
becomes problematic when assessing, for example, the consciousness of patients in cases of serious paralysis or 
what babies and young infants are actually feeling / experiencing. 
22 See Table 1 of Seth et al., “Criteria for consciousness.” 
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behavioural correlates of consciousness); and evolutionary. In all cases analogy with human 
beings plays a major role, with similarities or continuities between animal and human minds 
often highlighted. However, Darwin’s view that the differences are “one of degree and not of 
kind”23 has led to the danger of thinking that similarity implies equivalence. Consider, for 
instance, the many experiments that have tried to show that animals have a theory of mind 
similar to humans.24 For example, it has been proposed that the corvid re-caching of food 
indicates a theory of mind as individuals try to safeguard the food from other corvids who 
may have seen the initial caching occur. However, simpler explanations have also been 
proposed including one based on a relatively simple computer program able to reproduce the 
apparently complex corvid behaviour.25 The point is that apparently complex animal 
behaviours do not necessarily require consciousness to be present in the same way as in 
human beings.26 As Dawkins notes,27 the existence of so-called robo-pets that can mimic the 
behaviour of real animals also shows that complex behaviour does not necessarily require 
consciousness.28 More generally the assumption of similarity or continuity between animal 
                                                 
23 1871, The descent of man and selection in relation to sex – quoted in D.C. Penn, K.J. Holyoak & D.J. 
Povinelli, “Darwin’s mistake: Explaining discontinuity between human and non-human minds,” ural and Brain 
Sciences 31 (2008) 109-187. 
24 E. van der Vaart & C. K. Hemelrijk, “‘Theory of mind’ in animals: ways to make progress,” Synthese 191 
(2014): 335-354. This paper critically reviews the experimental evidence for the theory of mind in animals. It 
suggests that computational modeling might be a way to explore cognitive processes, so making it easier to go 
beyond one’s biases. 
25 E. van der Vaart, R. Verbrugge & C.K. Hemelrijk, “Corvid re-caching without ‘Theory of Mind’: a model,” 
PLoS ONE 7 (2012): 1-8. 
26 As discussed later, humans can also carry out apparently complex behaviours without conscious thought. 
27 Dawkins, Why animals matter, 38. 
28 It is good to bear in mind “Morgan’s Cannon”: In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the 
exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of one that stands lower in the 
psychological scale. Quoted on page 279 of A. Manning & M.S. Dawkins, An introduction to animal behaviour, 
6th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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and human minds has been challenged due to recent discoveries in human brain evolution,29 
the brain’s neural structure30 and cognitive architecture.31 Premack32 makes the important 
point that in examining similarities it is also important to ask: what are the dissimilarities? 
The reason is to avoid confusing similarity with equivalence.  
 
To further illustrate some of the complexities of understanding animal consciousness 
consider a recent exchange of views on mental time travel in rats.33 Mental time travel is the 
ability to mentally travel forward (or backward) in time to imagine possible future events (or 
review past ones). Humans possess this mental capacity, but do animals? For rats the 
argument that they can mentally time travel is based on evolutionary continuity and 
experimental evidence from studies of brain activity and behaviour. The argument that they 
cannot is based on an alternative interpretation of the experimental evidence and the lack of 
any clear proof that animals possess flexible foresight in the way humans do. With regard to 
the possession of flexible foresight, it could be argued that this is just a difference in degree, 
recalling the earlier point regarding the possibility of grades of consciousness, but this does 
not rule out that there might be a difference in kind between rats and humans (contra 
                                                 
29 T.M. Preuss, “Human brain evolution: from gene discovery to phenotype discovery,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 109 (2012): 10709-10716. 
30 D. Premack, “Human and animal cognition: continuity and discontinuity,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 104 (2007): 13861-13867. 
31 Penn et al., “Darwin’s mistake” argue that, although humans and animals share many similar cognitive 
mechanisms, only humans are able to “reinterpret” the world in terms of unobservable causal forces and mental 
states. They admit that their hypothesis has a number of substantial holes. Their article occupies pages 109-130, 
while pages 130-169 are an open peer commentary, which gives good “flavor” of the issues involved. 
32 Premack, “Human and animal cognition” 
33 M.C. Corballis, “Mental time travel: a case for evolutionary continuity,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 
(2013): 5-6; T. Suddendorf, “Mental time travel: continuities and discontinuities,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
17 (2013): 151-152; M.C. Corballis, “The wandering rat: response to Suddendorf,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
17 (2013): 152. Note that this exchange only occupies four journal pages and usefully illustrates key points, but 
the literature on these topics is vast. 
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Darwin’s view that differences between animals and humans are ones of degree not kind). As 
noted by Suddendorf,34 people on both sides of the argument admit that they do not know 
what an animal subjectively experiences and whether a particular type of self-knowing 
consciousness is involved in mental time travel.  
 
Stemming from these uncertainties there is a need for a more developed theory of 
consciousness in both humans35 and animals.36 This is especially critical if inferences about 
the presence or absence of consciousness are to be made. While various theories have been 
proposed none seems to have gained widespread acceptance.37 There appears to be no clear 
consensus on whether animals are self-conscious (have subjective awareness) and if so to 
what degree as compared to human beings. After reviewing the evidence for animal minds 
Manning & Dawkins38 similarly state that there is “no question of final conclusions, here.” 
Taking note of this, we now return to the issue of suffering. 
 
                                                 
34 Suddendorf, “Mental time travel.” 
35 O. Gosseries, H. Di, S. Laureys & M. Boly, “Measuring consciousness in severely damaged brains,” Annual 
Review of Neuroscience 37 (2014): 457-478. This article discusses the difficulties of assessing consciousness in 
patients with severe brain damage and distinguishing between these states and something like locked in 
syndrome, where the patient is conscious but unable to communicate. They conclude that consciousness is 
tricky to diagnose clinically. Given these difficulties is assessing consciousness in human beings it is 
unsurprising that we face difficulties in doing likewise for animals. 
36 M. Boly, A.K. Seth, M. Wilke, P. Ingmundson, B. Baars, S. Laureys, D.B. Edelman & N. Tsuchiya, 
“Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions,” Frontiers 
Psychology 4 (2013) 1-20. Dawkins, Why animals matter, 62. 
37 See section on theories in Boly et al., “Consciousness in humans and non-human animals.” Dawkins, Why 
animals matter, makes a similar point on page 62. Tononi & Koch, “Consciousness: here, there and 
everywhere” discuss the so-called Information Integration Theory of Consciousness (IITC). 
38 Manning & Dawkins, An introduction to animal behaviour, 293. 
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A review of the scientific evidence for animal suffering 
Moral beliefs, for example, that it is wrong to inflict suffering, will have different 
implications for our behaviour depending on the scientific evidence as to which creatures can 
suffer. At one end of the spectrum it is unlikely that we will ever have any qualms about 
destroying bacteria that cause disease. At the other end of the spectrum we might choose to 
adopt a vegetarian lifestyle if we think that animals being bred for food suffer.39 For this 
reason understanding the scientific evidence must be considered prior to any discussion of its 
moral and ethical implications. 
 
The term suffering as applied to human beings covers a wide range of feelings: fear, 
boredom, exhaustion, grief, thirst, hunger, and so on. Generally it is taken to mean a 
subjective experience only truly known to the person experiencing it, and known to others 
primarily by the verbal communication that the person uses to express what they are feeling. 
As noted above, verbal communication of feelings is not an approach that can be used when 
trying to determine whether animals suffer.40 
 
The science of animal suffering is restricted in the evidence that can be adduced for the view 
that animals suffer like we do and, as with the study of animal consciousness, arguments by 
                                                 
39 See A. Linzey, Animal theology (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1994), for this viewpoint. Note that, in our 
experience, some who call themselves vegetarians eat fish and some do not. Again the scientific evidence as to 
whether fish experience pain and suffering might influence that type of decision. 
40 While some attempts have been made with regard to “verbal” communication with certain animals e.g 
teaching language to apes (see pages 99-110 in R.N. Wennberg, God, humans and animals: an invitation to 
enlarge our moral universe (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003)) this has not 
reached the level of expressing subtleties of feeling (to our knowledge) that would allow the issue of animal 
suffering to be directly addressed by this approach. 
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analogy need to be treated with caution41. Similarly the lines of evidence used to assess 
whether animals suffer like we do are often identical to those used to examine the problem of 
consciousness, namely: neurophysiological, behavioural and evolutionary.42  
 
Neurophysiological evidence 
Neurophysiologically it is not straightforward to tell in humans from someone’s autonomic 
responses whether they are feeling angry, fearful, excited and so on. These changes can occur 
unconsciously; for example, in response to viewing subliminal images of happy or sad 
faces.43 Therefore it is difficult to distinguish conscious / unconscious responses from 
observed physiological changes (though one can sometimes distinguish on the basis of a 
verbal report). Furthermore, apparently pleasurable activities, such as sex and hunting prey, 
can lead to some similar physiological changes to those that are generated by unpleasant 
experiences, such as escaping a predator.44 For example, in human beings music, sex, food 
and drugs can “light up” the same areas of the brain measured using fMRI,45 but such 
techniques are not of a sufficient resolution to allow an experimenter to distinguish between 
                                                 
41 Note caution about the argument by analogy expressed by C.M. Sherwin, “Can invertebrates suffer? Or how 
robust is the argument-by-analogy?” Animal Welfare 10 (2001): S103-S118. Dawkins, Why animals matter on 
page 97 uses the term “leap of analogy” when discussing the conclusion that emotions in humans and animals 
must be similar because we have similar physiology. 
42 An interesting question (which we do not pursue here) is whether suffering is maladaptive possibly serving no 
useful evolutionary purpose or even being a disadvantage, in some circumstances. Consider a person suffering 
from severe depression, for example, who is unable to function in society or deal with simple life issues. To be 
depressed requires self-awareness, and while self-awareness itself may be adaptive it may allow the maladaptive 
ability to suffer. 
43 T.D. Sweeny, M. Grabowecky, S. Suzuki & K.A. Paller, “Long-lasting effects of subliminal affective priming 
from facial expressions,” Consciousness and Cognition, 18 (2009): 929-938. 
44 Linking autonomic responses to emotions in humans is an active area of research, see chapter 5 of D. Keltner, 
K. Oatley & J.M. Jenkins, Understanding emotions (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013); for animals see also M.S. 
Dawkins, “A user’s guide to animal welfare science,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 21 (2006): 77-82. 
45 A.J. Blood & R.J. Zatore, “Intensely pleasurable responses to music correlate with activity in brain regions 
implicated in reward and emotion,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98 (2001): 11818-11823. 
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the causes of the response. Similarly, while changes in brain chemistry, particularly levels of 
serotonin and oxytocin, have been studied in relation to emotional states in humans, these 
relationships are not yet fully understood.46  This means that simply measuring 
neurophysiological responses in animals is unlikely to provide a definitive answer to the 
question of whether animals suffer. That animals experience such neurophysiological 
changes is well established (see, for example, a study of hunted red deer).47 As it is difficult 
to know what observable neurophysiological evidence to look for in ourselves to determine 
whether someone is subjectively experiencing suffering, it is unsurprising that it is very 
difficult to know what evidence to look for in other species that would conclusively settle the 
question. 
 
A related approach is to examine neurophysiological similarities in human and animals 
where, for instance a study of comparative brain anatomy led by McPhail48 concluded that 
only humans are conscious, whilst a study by Baars49 concluded that at least all vertebrates 
are. Here the issue of consciousness impinges on whether suffering can be experienced by 
animals in the same way as humans. Craig, commenting on animal models of pain, states: 
“The inescapable truth is that pain in humans is indeed a subjective experience. The available 
evidence indicates that neither rodents nor monkeys can experience feelings in the same way 
that humans do.”50 These studies illustrate that there is a range of scientific views on how 
similar animals and humans might be in terms of their experience of suffering. Further 
                                                 
46 See, for example, G. Miller, “The promise and peril of oxytocin,” Science 339 (2013): 267-269; and chapter 6 
of Keltner et al., Understanding emotions. 
47 P. Bateson & E.L. Bradshaw, “Physiological effects of hunting red deer (Cervus elaphus),” Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of London B 264 (1997): 1707-1714. 
48 E.M. McPhail, The evolution of consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
49 B.J. Baars, “There are no known differences in brain mechanisms of consciousness between humans and 
other mammals,” Animal Welfare 10 (2001) S31-S40. 
50 A.D. Craig, “A rat is not a monkey is not a human,” Nature Reviews of Neuroscience, 10 (2009): 466. 
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studies have been carried out using MRI and similar techniques to try to compare human and 
chimpanzee brains, but this work is in its infancy and conclusive results are still to come.51 
Thus the neurophysiological evidence to date is inconclusive and may need the development 
of new techniques before more can be contributed to this discussion.52 
 
Behavioural evidence 
The problem of consciousness arises again when considering behavioural responses. Some 
extremely complex behaviours can be carried out both consciously and unconsciously. For 
example, driving a car can be done on “autopilot” with no recollection of the journey – a 
common experience for many drivers. Another example is playing a musical instrument; an 
ability that, once mastered (with conscious effort), can be done with little conscious thought. 
Indeed, being “lost in the music” may elicit a finer performance from the musician. These are 
examples of what Dawkins describes as multiple routes to the same behaviour, only some of 
which are conscious.53 A further complication is that apparently complex outcomes can arise 
from simple rule following. One of us plays chess and occasionally plays against his 
computer (which often wins), but the computer is simply following a set of rules and in no 
way can be regarded as being conscious. Yet it demonstrates complex “human-like 
behaviour” that surpasses the abilities of any animal (no-one has yet taught an animal to play 
chess to our knowledge). With these caveats in mind let us consider the behavioural evidence 
for animal suffering. 
 
                                                 
51 See J. Cohen, “The inner workings of the chimpanzee brain,” Science 328 (2010) 40-41. It may be that 
obtaining conclusive results from comparative MRI scans of human and chimpanzee brains may prove elusive. 
52 For more on this point see Dawkins, (2012) op. cit. 
53 Dawkins, “Through animal eyes.” 
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Animal behaviour has been extensively studied in the context of animal welfare. An animal’s 
emotional states are often thought to be defined by what animals find positively or negatively 
reinforcing. So behavioural responses to given situations, for example, seeking to escape 
from something found unpleasant, can be tested experimentally by giving animals choices. 
The animal’s responses may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings of pleasure or 
suffering – this is impossible to determine from this type of experiment. It is important to 
note that choice per se is no evidence of sentience. 54 Plants grow towards light and bacteria 
respond to chemical gradients by moving (chemotaxis)55 but we would not consider either 
plants or bacteria sentient. 
 
Consider a classic experiment on self-medication in chickens.56 Given a choice of feeding 
from two feeders, one containing an analgesic mixed in with the food, lame chickens 
preferential eat from the one with the analgesic (presumably to relieve their pain). Chickens 
that aren’t lame show no preference for one food source over the other. This is suggests an 
awareness of pain and a desire to relieve it (avoidance of suffering). However, a non-
conscious explanation of the observations is possible. Dawkins’57 example is that of car 
programmed to fill itself up with several kinds of lubricants, based on which in the past had 
been shown to result in the lowest fuel consumption. The car could then be said to find one 
lubricant more “rewarding”, that is, more likely to be ingested in the future, but we would not 
consider the car to be conscious.58 
                                                 
54 Dawkins, “Evolution and animal welfare.” 
55 V. Sourjik & N.S. Wingreen, “Responding to chemical gradients: bacterial chemotaxis,” Current Opinion in 
Cell Biology 24 (2012): 262-268.  
56 Dawkins, “A user’s guide to animal welfare science.” 
57 Dawkins, “A user’s guide to animal welfare science.” 
58 Of course, there are some who argue that human beings self-conscious awareness may be an after-the-fact 
explanation rather than a causal force. This issue is explored by Peter Clarke in Faraday Paper no. 17 The Libet 
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Behavioural evidence that animals experience suffering exists for apes and elephants in the 
wild, as well as for the domesticated animals (for example, chickens, pigs). Douglas-
Hamilton and co-workers describe the behavioural reactions of a herd of elephants towards a 
dying and deceased matriarch.59 They observed elephants exhibiting traits, like humans do, of 
rendering assistance to the ailing and showing special interest in the dead bodies of their own 
kind. They conclude that, “It is an example of how elephants and humans may share 
emotions, such as compassion, and have an awareness and interest about death.” De Waal 
describes similar behaviour in primates. After describing how chimpanzees protect an injured 
individual and clean their wounds, he concludes, “Does this indeed prove that chimpanzees 
have empathy, and, by extension, that other injury-cleaning mammals do too? Unfortunately, 
the tending of wounds per se tells us nothing about the underlying mental processes.”60 
Clearly such evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive in terms of being analogous to 
human behaviour. A counter-example is quoted by Wall, who notes that, “…when an old 
deer is culled by shooting and drops dead, the other members of the herd briefly startle but 
then continue grazing and ignore the corpse.”61 This suggests a lack of response to suffering 
and death. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
experiment and its implications for conscious free will (which can be downloaded from http://www.faraday.st-
edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources/Faraday%20Papers/Faraday%20Paper%2017%20Clarke_EN.pdf). 
59 I. Douglas-Hamilton, S. Bhalla, G. Wittemyer & F. Vollrath, “Behavioural reactions of elephants towards a 
dying and deceased matriarch,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 100 (2006): 87-102. 
60 Page 58 in F. De Waal, Good natured: the origins of rights and wrong in humans and other animals 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
61 Page 12 in Wall, Pain: the science of suffering. 
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The major problem with much of the behavioural evidence is that it is ambiguous and open to 
more than one interpretation.62 While such evidence is useful in helping us determine how we 
might treat animals better, it does not conclusively prove or disprove any assertions about 
animal suffering like us. This is not inconsistent with similar conclusions more famously 
highlighted by Thomas Nagel – to paraphrase – we will never know what it is like to be a 
bat.63 
 
Evolutionary evidence 
From an evolutionary perspective, our similarity to other great apes (hominidae) suggests that 
some degree of consciousness might be expected in our close animal relatives. However, 
even here it is unclear how close the similarity must be in order for the argument by analogy 
to hold. Thus Bermond64 argues that a prefrontal cortex (PFC; in evolutionary terms the most 
recent brain region) is a prerequisite for the experience of pain as an emotion, or suffering – 
on this basis, suffering in animals would be confined to great apes, as only they show a well 
developed PFC. He notes that other mammals also have PFCs, but some parts of the PFC are 
specific to humans. However, it is worth noting that there are significant differences between 
humans and the great apes,65 so it is by no means obvious that that the possession of a PFC 
will lead to a similar response in terms of suffering. 
 
                                                 
62 On a related point A. Thornton & K. McAuliffe, “Teaching in wild meerkats,” Science 313 (2006): 227-229 
note that “teaching can be based on simple mechanisms without the need for intentionality and attribution of 
mental states” (page 229). It is anthropomorphizing to attribute mental states when observations of animal 
behaviour could be explained by simpler mechanisms (recall “Morgan’s Canon”). 
63 T. Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Reviews 83 (1974): 435-450. 
64 Bermond, “A neurophysiological and evolutionary approach.” 
65 See, for example, Penn et al., “Darwin’s mistake,” also discussion in J. Taylor, Not a chimp (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), particularly chapter 10 Inside the Brain – the Devil is in the detail, and R. Tallis, Aping 
Mankind: neuromania, Darwinitis and the misrepresentation of humanity (Durham: Acumen Publishing Ltd, 
2011). 
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In pursuing his argument, Bermond66 further notes that irreflexive consciousness and 
suffering don’t go together – suffering and pain which is experienced as unpleasant is an 
emotional experience, and reflection is necessary for such experiences. In contrast, the simple 
perception of pain, which does not induce suffering, is possible with an irreflexive 
consciousness. This again touches on the “hard problem” of consciousness. 
 
It should also be noted that the regulation of pain behaviour at the spinal cord level evolved 
much earlier than that for a conscious response. This means that animals can respond to pain 
stimuli in cases where no conscious response can be possible. Allen gives examples of this in 
two of his papers. First, rats with severed spinal cords, so that no information reaches their 
brains, still show a learning response to noxious stimuli (electrical shocks to their hind legs) 
that must therefore be being controlled by the spinal cord, resulting in adaptive changes in 
behaviour.67 Second, a headless alligator’s forelimbs will swipe quite precisely at the point of 
a scalpel incision by means of a spinal reflex.68 From an evolutionary perspective natural 
selection leads to behavioural mechanisms that help ensure the survival of the body, which is 
adaptive. However, such adaptive responses could be the result of simple rules (perhaps 
operating at the spinal cord level) or conscious choices, but the behavioural outcome would 
appear similar. As Dawkins notes,69 “the fact that we share many physiological mechanisms 
and behavioural responses with other species, particularly mammals, cannot be used as 
conclusive evidence that they share our conscious experiences, too.” 
 
                                                 
66 Bermond, “A neurophysiological and evolutionary approach.” 
67 C. Allen, “Animal pain,” Nous 38 (2004) 617-643. 
68 C. Allen, “The discovery of animal consciousness: an optimistic assessment,” Journal of Agricultural & 
Environmental Ethics, 10 (1998) 217-225. 
69 Dawkins, “Evolution and animal welfare.” 
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One issue, apparently not addressed by Bermond70 but raised by Dawkins,71 is his implicit 
assumption that a particular brain structure is necessary for consciousness. It could be that in 
species very different to humans other brain pathways using different brain structure could 
give rise to consciousness (an argument that might be supported by the idea of “convergent 
evolution” – that is, similar evolutionary ends can be achieved by different evolutionary 
pathways).72 An example would be octopi (cephalopods), whose neural structure is very 
different to that of human beings but who are thought to exhibit intelligence.73 
 
Opposing conclusions? 
The scientific evidence that we have reviewed above leads different authors to opposing 
conclusions. After consideration of the evidence Bermond concludes: 
“Rejoice! Rejoice! For there is far less animal suffering than our anthropomorphic minds 
are inclined to believe”74 
While after her consideration of the evidence Dawkins’ conclusion is somewhat different: 
“Personally, I do believe that many animals subjectively experience suffering but I also 
believe that my own belief is not scientific and I would not attempt to justify it on scientific 
grounds.”75 
 
                                                 
70 Bermond, “A neurophysiological and evolutionary approach.” 
71 Dawkins, “Evolution and animal welfare.” 
72 On convergent evolution see, for example, S. Conway Morris, Life’s solution, (Cambridge: CUP, 2003). 
73 J.A. Mather, “Cephalopod consciousness: behavioural evidence,” Consciousness & Cognition 17 (2008): 37-
48; J.A. Mather, “To boldly go where no mollusc has gone before: Personality, play, thinking, and 
consciousness in cephalopods,” American Malacological Bulletin 24 (2008): 51-58; L. Zullo & B. Hochner, “A 
new perspective on the organization of an invertebrate brain,” Communicative & Integrative Biology 4 (2011): 
26-29. 
74 Bermond, “A neurophysiological and evolutionary approach.” 
75 M.S. Dawkins, “The science of animal suffering,” Ethology 114 (2008): 937-945. 
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After considering the scientific research that has been done to-date, our own conclusion is 
that the empirical evidence leads us into arguments identical to those in the philosophical 
literature surrounding the hard problem of consciousness. As such a clear answer is not 
possible at this point in time76 (and some say may never be possible).77 We note however that 
this should not be taken as carte blanche to ignore the needs of animals – irrespective of 
whether those animals are domesticated, wild or being studied in the laboratory. 
 
A brief reflection on why Christians should treat animals well 
Where does the above review of the scientific evidence for animal suffering leave us in terms 
of a Christian response? Here a brief reflection is provided as a possible starting point for 
developing a fuller theological response. 
 
Looking at the bible overall, and the New Testament in particular, we see that it is future-
orientated (eschatological).78 This future orientation is relevant to the problem of evil and 
suffering (animal and human); as Wright notes “the ultimate answer to the problem of evil is 
                                                 
76 In this respect, despite being 20 years on, our conclusions do not differ significantly from those of M. Rose & 
D. Adams, “Evidence for pain and suffering in other animals,” chapter 3: 42-71 in Animal experimentation, G. 
Langley ed., (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1989).  
77 An interesting anecdote about David Livingstone (19th century medical missionary in Africa) is provided by 
M. Jackson, Pain: the science of why we hurt, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing plc, 2005; pages 281-282). 
Livingstone was attacked by a lion, survived and made the following observation about his experience, “The 
shock produced a stupor similar to that which seems to be felt by a mouse after the first shake of the cat.  It 
caused a sort of dreaminess, in which there as no sense of pain nor feeling of terror, though [I was] quite 
conscious of all that was happening. It was like what patients partially under the influence of chloroform 
describe who see all the operation but feel not the knife. This singular condition was not the result of any mental 
process. The shake annihilated fear, allowed no sense of horror in looking round at the beast. This peculiar state 
is probably produced in all animals killed by carnivora; and if so, is a merciful provision by our benevolent 
Creator for lessening the pain of death.” Of course, whether non-human animals have similar experiences in 
such circumstances is impossible to determine (it is difficult to conceive of an ethical experimental test). 
78 See T. Wright, Surprised by hope (London: SPCK, 2007) and G.E. Ladd, The presence of the future (Grand 
Rapids: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996). 
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to be found in God’s creation of a new world, new heavens and new earth, with redeemed, 
renewed human beings ruling over it and bringing to it God’s wise healing order.”79 This gels 
with one aspect of Southgate’s approach, namely the future fate of animals as explored in his 
chapter “Heaven for pelicans?”80 We note that biblical passages such as Isaiah 11:1-9 and 
65:17-25 while perhaps poetic imagery – “the wolf will live with the lamb” – are also more 
than just poetic. They are indicative of the peace of God coming in the animal kingdom in the 
new creation (even if it is difficult to be specific as to what that means in detail with regard to 
animals on a renewed Earth).81 This is foreshadowed perhaps in Jesus’ peaceful encounter 
with the wild animals in the wilderness (Mark 1:13).82 
 
How then should we treat animals in the present in light of this future-oriented 
(eschatological) perspective? Since the concept of thinking and living eschatologically may 
not be familiar we briefly describe it here.83 Focusing on the end (eschaton) should affect 
our behaviour (ethics) in the here and now, as it holds forth a picture of a future reality 
which has already begun through Jesus’s death, resurrection, ascension, and sending of the 
Holy Spirit (the “now and not yet” aspect of the kingdom of God).84 It is inconsistent for 
believers to act as if this future hope had no present relevance. Christians aim to realize the 
                                                 
79 N.T. Wright, Evil and the justice of God (London: SPCK, 2006). 
80 Chapter 5 in Southgate, The groaning of creation. 
81 John Wesley certainly expected animals to be part of the new creation and saw this as an answer to their 
suffering in this present age. See his Sermon 60 on Romans 8:19-22 “The general deliverance.” Interestingly, 
both Southgate, The groaning of creation (page 78) and Murray, Nature red in tooth and claw (page 123) make 
reference to Wesley’s views. 
82 On this passage see R. Bauckham, “Jesus and animals II: what did he practice?” pp.49-60 in A. Linzey A. & 
D. Yamamoto (eds), Animals on the agenda: questions about animals for theology and ethics (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1998). 
83 M.A. Srokosz, “God’s story and the Earth’s story: grounding our concern for the environment in the biblical 
metanarrative,” Science & Christian Belief 20 (2008): 163-174 and Wright, Surprised by hope. 
84 On the “now and not yet” of the kingdom of God see the reprinted and now classic text Ladd, The 
presence of the future. 
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prayer, “your kingdom come, your will be done on Earth as it is in heaven” (Matt 6:10). 
This means that we are working in the present for an Earth that reflects the coming new 
creation, in part, because of the continuity between this world and the one to come (Romans 
8).85 The expectation is that the new creation will be just that, a new creation (including 
animals) and not just a new humanity.86 There is both continuity and discontinuity between 
the present creation and the new creation, just as there is between our present bodies and our 
resurrection bodies. The latter is exemplified in Jesus, whose resurrection body was clearly 
both different from, yet similar to, his mortal body (Luke 24:13-49; John 20:19-29). 
Therefore, how we live now and how we treat God’s Earth and the creatures on it, will affect 
the new creation to come, and this should shape our thinking and our behaviour in the 
present.  
 
This obligation to live in light of the future needs to be worked out in terms of the tension 
that exists in terms of the continuity / discontinuity between this world and the renewed 
Earth. Therefore, we need to look carefully at what the bible says with regard to that 
continuity / discontinuity87 and that is considered briefly in what follows with respect to 
animals.  
 
                                                 
85 On the continuity / discontinuity between the present creation and the new creation see M.B. Stephens, 
Annihilation or Renewal: The Meaning and Function of New Creation in the Book of Revelation 
( Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 
86 The presence of animals in the new creation has most recently been discussed by H.A. Snyder & J. Scandrett, 
Salvation means creation healed: the ecology of sin and grace (Oregon: Cascade Books, Eugene, 2011), and 
references therein. 
87 As noted by one of the referees, marriage will not exist on the renewed Earth (Matthew 22:30) but that is not 
necessarily a reason for advocating celibacy in this life. Clearly, God intends marriage for this world (Genesis 1 
& 2) but not the next (Matthew 22:30). Similarly, in considering animals we need to examine the scriptures to 
tease out the continuity / discontinuity issues and some pointers are given here, but not a complete biblical 
theology (see Snyder & Scandrett, Salvation means creation healed for more on this point). 
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Whatever our view of animal theodicies or other ways of explaining the suffering of animals, 
and of the scientific evidence, our responsibilities seem clear. Living in the light of God’s 
future purpose for his creation88 means that we are to care for animals and other creatures just 
as God does (e.g. Ps:104:16-28, 147:9). This means that we must take seriously Jesus’ 
peaceable interactions with the wild animals (Mark 1:13) and Isaiah’s vision of a peaceable 
future kingdom (Isaiah 11:1-9, 65:17-25). Are we aiming to live at peace with the wild 
animals? How is that to be accomplished? Perhaps as a starting point we should be concerned 
with the reduction in the habitats available to wild animals across the globe? In addition, we 
should express concern about the needless exploitation of wild animals, such as the slaughter 
of elephants for their tusks, rhinoceroses for their horns and tigers for their bones (there are 
many other examples). 
 
In a scientific context there is the issue of whether it is right or not to use animals in 
laboratory experiments and under what circumstances. In what way should our practice as 
scientists reflect God’s coming kingdom? We do not propose any easy answers to such 
questions here. As a minimum requirement, Proverbs 12:10 tells us “a righteous man cares 
for the needs of his animal,” so at the very least the bible requires us to look after 
domesticated animals and so Christians should have a concern for animal welfare. 
Practically, this might affect the choice of experiments that we do as scientists or the food we 
buy and eat.89 If we are to be the image of God in creation90 we need to care for the whole of 
it, as He does. The challenge is: do we? 
                                                 
88 On this approach see Srokosz, “God’s story and the Earth’s story” and Wright, Surprised by hope. 
89 This is not the place for an extended discussion of the issue of vegetarianism, nor of ethical shopping for food, 
but they are issues worth thinking about further. Note that in Genesis 9:3 God gave permission for humans to 
use animals for food in this world, but it is unclear what provision will be made for food on the renewed Earth. 
Feasts (Matthew 22:1-14; 25:1-13) and fruit (Revelation 22:2) seem to play a part. 
 23 Srokosz & Kolstoe 
 
Conclusions 
When we started writing this article we thought that the scientific evidence would enable us 
to answer the question of whether animals suffer like us. However, as can be seen from the 
review of key aspects of the science, matters are rather more complex than we expected. The 
main conclusion that can be drawn from the scientific evidence is that the problem of animal 
suffering is remarkably similar, if not identical, to that of the hard problem of consciousness.  
Wittgenstein's aphorism, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" may be relevant 
here.91 Can we ever really expect to understand what animals feel if we cannot tell whether 
they are self-aware like us? Furthermore even if animals could talk, would we be able to 
understand their experiences, which differ significantly from our own – we have enough 
trouble understanding members of our own species at times! Another difficult question is: 
how much do we project our own experiences onto animals? We do this often, and quite 
often incorrectly, with other human beings. Is it likely that we will do better with animals? 
Interpretation of the scientific evidence is clearly coloured by a priori beliefs and by our 
tendency to anthropomorphize, from which we ourselves do not claim to be immune. It may 
be that advances in neurophysiology, behavioural science, evolutionary theory and the study 
of consciousness may eventually allow a conclusive answer to the question of animal 
suffering, but for now the best that can be said is: we don’t know. It would appear that 
Darwin’s confident assertion that, “The fact that the lower animals are excited by the same 
emotions as ourselves is so well established…” was made prematurely and that considerable 
work is required to determine whether or not this is the case scientifically. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
90 For more on the image of God and how this relates to animals see J.M. Moritz, “Animals and the image of 
God in the bible and beyond,” Dialog 48 (2009): 134-146. 
91 See also Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?” 
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In terms of our (Christian) response to the question of animal suffering, even if the scientific 
evidence is inconclusive, it seems clear that humanity is biblically mandated to care for 
God’s creation. Therefore, our response should be to care about the welfare of God’s 
creatures in God’s creation. This implies that our aim should be to minimize any potential for 
suffering,92 not on a utilitarian basis (a calculus of suffering being an impossible calculation), 
but out of love for God and care for his creation. We do this is the hope and anticipation of 
the new creation – a new heaven and new earth – where suffering (human and animal) will be 
no more.93 
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92 It is beyond our human abilities to eliminate the potential for animal suffering. 
93 Revelation 21:4; Romans 8:18-23. 
